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In recent years, discussion of European cultural values has increasingly included the 
proposition that ‘Europe’ needs to face up to its difficult past(s). For European projects 
of cooperation and integration considerable significance is now attributed to history and 
memory. This is a historical novelty. The determination to avoid another war among 
European nations has long been central to the master narrative of European integration. 
Yet at least until the 1980s, ‘Europe’ in the sense of the European Economic 
Community and the European Community (EC) was a purely economic, legal-political 
entity. It had few shared values and symbols, and certainly was not a community of 
memory. As Tony Judt (2000, 293) argues, both western integration and that pursued 
under Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe were characterised by ‘the erection of an 
unnatural and unsustainable frontier between past and present in European public 
memory’ (or better, in European public memories). Shared memories in the west were 
limited to the integration process itself and did not reach back beyond 1945, apart from 
the resolve of ‘never again.’ A focus on the future rather than the past had also 
characterised older concepts of European integration (Speth 1999, 169). 
 
1 This article began as a paper presented at a September 2005 workshop of the ‘Competing Euro Visions’ 
project at the Institute for International Studies, University of Technology, Sydney, and benefited 
subsequently from the author’s participation in Bo Stråth’s seminar ‘Historical writing and politics of 
remembrance’ at the European University Institute, Florence, in 2006-7. It is a slightly revised English 
language version of a chapter, ‘Geschichte und Erinnerung in deutschen und europäischen 
Einigungsdiskursen,’ in ‘Schmerzliche Erfahrungen’ der Vergangenheit und der Prozess der 
Konstitutionalisierung Europas, edited by C. Joerges, M. Mahlmann and U. K. Preuß (forthcoming 2007). 
The author gratefully acknowledges the publisher, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, for permission to 
publish this English-language version.  
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Direct concern with the past increased only in the last two decades. The promotion of a 
shared historical consciousness became part of a larger attempt to imbue the dry 
bureaucratic and economic process of European integration with a common identity. 
Since the 1980s, discussions of ‘European values’ have frequently, but by no means 
exclusively, addressed the legacy of twentieth-century warfare and genocide in Europe 
(Speth 1999; Rousso 2004). This trend accelerated with the prospect and, since 2004, 
the advent, of the accession to the European Union (EU) of former members of the 
Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe (Thum 2004, 7; Gellner and Glatzmeier 2005, 11). Of 
course, one should not fall into the trap of equating Europe with the EU. The larger and 
looser Council of Europe also promotes joint projects for the teaching of history at 
schools and commemoration of the Holocaust.2 Such enterprises are inseparable from 
the spread of ‘cosmopolitan memory’ of the Holocaust throughout the Americanised 
world (Levy and Sznaider 2002). 
 
The EU ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ takes the effort to anchor the 
integration process in a common understanding of history to a new level. References in 
the constitution’s preamble to Europe being ‘reunited after bitter experiences’ and to the 
European peoples’ determination ‘to transcend their former divisions’ indicate this new, 
official prominence (European Union 2004). Awareness of, and (more or less self-
conscious) confrontation with the painful past are apparently to function as a driving 
force of the integration project in the present and future. As Christian Joerges (2005, 
248) has pointed out with understatement, it is possible to imagine a more substantial 
formulation than the preamble provides. It remains unclear which bitter experiences are 
meant, how Europe’s citizens intend to transcend their previous divisions, and how and 
when Europe managed to reunite itself. Lack of specificity is hardly unusual in such a 
context. However, as Murray Pratt (2005, 7) argues, it remains characteristic of the 
circular, unreflective moment of EU perpetual self-constitution. There is much to be 
said for Pratt’s suggestion that the past division in mind is not an internal one, but the 
foundational severing of the chosen ‘Europa’ from her southern and eastern neighbours 
and subsequent others (2005, 15). 
 
                                                 
2 See the projects of the General Directorate IV for Education, Culture and Heritage, Youth and Sport 
(Council of Europe 2007a and 2007b; Domnitz 2007). 
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The premise of this article, however, is that historical divisions and experiences within 
Europe lie at the heart of attempts to forge a common European memory in support of 
integration. The history of the Cold War and the continent’s division into East and West 
are of particular importance, as is suggested not least by the fact that the preamble’s 
reference to the bitter past was a Polish initiative (Joerges 2005, 248). As important as 
the Holocaust and (post-)colonialism and their consequences are (Müller 2007), the 
continent’s real and imagined east-west division should not be neglected. Memory of 
the latter, as well as being intimately connected to that of the Holocaust, is important in 
its own right, but often receives less scholarly attention, particularly in the Anglophone 
world. 
 
This article considers whether and how German efforts to create a shared, national 
history and public memory after unification in 1990 can inform the European 
discussion. The union of the western Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the 
eastern German Democratic Republic (GDR) has often been cast as a small-scale 
experiment of the integration of western and eastern Europe, or more specifically of the 
EU’s eastward expansion. In economics and migration studies, for example, ‘lessons’ 
for Europe have been sought from German experiences, often with a view to avoiding 
the problems of the German case (Sinn 2000; Hochberg 1998). In contrast, German 
experiences with confronting difficult twentieth-century pasts are on the whole viewed 
positively. Indeed, recent commentators have suggested that German handling of the 
‘double’ totalitarian past could be instructive and even exemplary for Europe (Troebst 
2006, 26; Faulenbach 2006, 248-49). 
 
In this article, I explore, critically, what lessons, if any, German experiences might in 
fact hold for ‘Europe.’ In the German context, discussions of public memory focussed 
on two related goals: on the one hand, the achievement of a unified public memory of 
National Socialism and Communism, and, on the other, the development of a common 
history of the divided postwar era. Both tasks were pursued most energetically, 
prominently and directly, by two Commissions of Inquiry of the German Federal 
Parliament between 1992 and 1998 (Deutscher Bundestag 1995 and 1999), which were 
the subject of the author’s doctoral thesis (Beattie 2005a). This provides the major 
empirical source for the present article’s discussion of German experiences, although I 
also draw more generally on German commemorative politics in the first decade after 
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unification, and contrast this with often more sophisticated historiography. The primary 
purpose of this paper is not to analyse the German case per se, but to question 
assumptions about its exemplary status for European projects and to consider its 
relevance to those projects.3 The second section addresses the treatment of the East-
West division during the Cold War, while debates about totalitarianism and the 
relationship between National Socialism and Communism in public memory are the 
subject of the third and final part. In both sections, European parallels with, and possible 
‘lessons’ from the German experiences are discussed, using examples from recent 
‘European’ public memory debates and initiatives and historiography on the one hand, 
and the author’s own research and the growing secondary literature on Germany on the 
other. First, however, it is necessary to consider the comparability of the two contexts, 
and thus the limiting preconditions for any German lessons for Europe. 
 
Differing Starting Points and Similar Goals 
Parallels between German unification and European integration and expansion are 
problematic, as there are considerable differences in the character of the processes, with 
implications for history and public memory. The opening of the German-German border 
in November 1989 caught the political establishments and publics on both sides by 
surprise. The remarkable speed of the subsequent ‘rush to German unity’ (Jarausch 
1994), formalised in October 1990, resulted not least from the assumption of continuing 
German ethno-national identity and indeed homogeneity, despite forty years of division. 
The process was frequently (and not least by the western politicians who drove the 
constitutional process) conceived as reunification, as the restoration of ‘normal’ nation-
statehood (Zens 2000). The insight that forty years of divergent socialisation had had 
enduring effects on East and West Germans, and the desire to purge them (mainly on 
the eastern side) in the name of ‘inner unity’ were later developments. Indeed, the 
project of a common history arose only in the years following formal unification. In the 
course of difficult ongoing integration, it was nevertheless viewed as an unproblematic 
and readily attainable goal (Wüstenberg 2004; Beattie 2005a). As much as the enlarged 
Federal Republic after 1990 differed from previous incarnations of German nation-, 
                                                 
3 A detailed treatment of the positions of various political camps is impossible within the scope of this 
article, which concentrates on the dominant views of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats who were 
in government from 1990 until 1998. Their positions on various issues were shared or rejected by Social 
Democrats and Greens, and rejected in total by the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). 
See Beattie (2005b) for a brief analysis and Beattie (2005a) for a more comprehensive one. 
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state-, or nation-state-hood, the parameters of German history appeared to be clearly 
defined, and recourse could be taken to extant understandings of national history and 
practices of public memory.4
 
Despite the loose talk in the Constitutional Treaty preamble of Europe being ‘reunited,’ 
European integration is conceived rather differently, not least where history and 
memory are concerned. As Judt (2005, 303, 308-9) argues, the beginnings of western 
European integration lay in quite traditional inter-state instruments and appeared only in 
retrospect as a revolutionary attempt at supranational integration. Yet long before the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc it had become clear that with the EC a qualitative novelty 
had come into existence and continued to constitute itself. With eastern expansion since 
2004, any remaining doubts about the constructed-ness of the union have disappeared, 
and post-entry integration is expected to remain a long-term project. This applies all the 
more to the project of a common history and memory, which, in contrast with the 
German case, is being pursued contemporaneously with economic, legal, social and 
political integration and expansion. Every plan for a shared European understanding of 
the past assumes the difficulty of overcoming inherited, primarily national, approaches 
to history (Pavković 2000). Both the ‘Europe’ of the Council of Europe and that of the 
European Union lack the definitional clarity and ready-made public memories of the 
German case. Where do (or should) the temporal and geographical borders of European 
history lie? What is to be understood as ‘European,’ and what as regional, national, 
global or (post-)colonial (Monteath 1999; Jarausch and Lindenberger 2007)? Such 
European problems of definition played little roles in the German case, although many 
of them arguably also applied, mutatis mutandis. 
 
Both the constructed and the processual nature of the European case appear to offer 
hope for more multiple perspectives and critical reflection than characterised the 
German example. During German unification, at most superficial differences between 
East and West were anticipated and a homogenous, indeed almost uniform, 
understanding of history was, and for years continued to be, desired. In contrast, 
European discourses assume considerable heterogeneity. For all the appeals to unity, the 
attractiveness and necessity of diversity are upheld. The expectations and hopes in both 
                                                 
4 The preamble to the unification treaty between East and West Germany spoke of ‘consciousness of the 
continuity of German history’ (Bewußtsein der Kontinuität deutscher Geschichte) (Vertrag 1990). 
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cases thus indicate the enduring significance of national identifications, albeit with 
contrasting consequences on the two levels. 
 
Further differences concern the pasts in question. There was no debate about 
colonialism in the German case, whereas it is, and must be, of greater significance for 
Europe as a whole.5 On the other hand, the German relationship with National 
Socialism, the Second World War and the Holocaust is necessarily different from any 
general European relationship, even if no European country can (or does) removes itself 
completely from discussions about complicity in the Holocaust and co-responsibility 
for, and accommodation with, dictatorships and occupation regimes. The German 
experience of the Cold War East-West division also differs from that of Europe in 
significant ways. 
 
Despite such differences, shared understandings of the past feature in both cases 
simultaneously as the prerequisite for, and the outcome of, further integration of the 
expanded community.6 Although varying degrees of anticipated and desired conformity 
and plurality are in evidence, and although the debate about memory commences at 
different phases of the integration processes, the dominant discourse in both cases holds 
that transcending ‘divided memory’ is necessary to overcome past and present 
cleavages and tensions, and to realise common visions of the future. Moreover, there are 
similarities in the imbalances of symbolic and intellectual capital. German unification 
was constitutionally, administratively and, to a considerable extent, intellectually 
accomplished as the accession of the eastern ‘new federal states’ to the Federal 
Republic. The balance of power was unmistakable, and not unlike that which 
characterises the accession to the EU club of the ‘new member states.’ The following 
sections demonstrate that, in accordance with this deeply asymmetrical unification 
                                                 
5 In recent years the colonial past has received more attention in Germany, but it was almost completely 
absent before the late 1990s. 
6 It is worth casting a second glance at the implications of the different phases of the integration processes 
during which the goal of a shared understanding of the past gained prominence. Above I suggested that 
the pursuit of a common memory as a component of the ongoing broader integration process in the 
European case represents a possible gain in terms of critical reflection and multiple perspectives. Yet if 
consenting to a particular ‘memory regime’ (Langenbacher 2003) constitutes an ‘entry ticket’ to the union 
(Judt 2005, 803), or, conversely, if divergence from the dominant partner’s memory regime represents a 
co-hindrance to entry, as in the case of Turkey and the EU, then the sequence of the German case—with 
the memory debate beginning only after formal political accession—appears more conducive to plurality 
and to agency on the part of the ‘minor’ party. In short, apologists for Communist rule in East Germany 
were not excluded from unification, but attacked and marginalised afterwards. 
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process, the course and outcome of public memory debates were characterised by 
varying degrees of inconsistency and hypocrisy, success and failure. 
 
Overcoming Cold War Divisions 
In Germany after 1990, the development of a common memory of the divided past was 
granted considerable significance for the ‘inner unity’ of the recently unified country. 
Politicians from various parties were disturbed by the apparently increasing alienation 
of easterners and westerners. In order to overcome the ‘Wall-in-the-head’ syndrome and 
the ‘crisis of unification’ (Kocka 1995), they argued, the Germans needed to listen to 
each others’ stories and to embrace the divided past. Politicians and allied historians—
primarily but by no means only from the political right—demanded a historically-rooted 
national identity, and sought to have the postwar era understood as a history of national 
suffering caused by Communist crimes, but also of eventual redemption through 
unification (Beattie 2005b; Zens 2000). History’s ‘re-nationalisation’ was thus to 
legitimise reunification and support integration (Jarausch 1995). Both historical 
scholarship and public memory were to praise those Germans who had held firm to their 
desire for national unity and to scorn those who had made themselves comfortable in 
national division or, worse still, embraced post-national values. In and beyond the 
Commissions of Inquiry, such criticism was directed at eastern dissidents who had still 
hoped for an independent East German state in 1989-1990. Above all, however, it 
targeted westerners, many of whom had become increasingly indifferent to, and 
ignorant of, the GDR. Some had come to equate the Federal Republic with ‘Germany,’ 
a tendency that culminated in GDR citizens who crossed the border following the 
breaching of the Berlin Wall being met with such greetings as ‘Welcome to Germany’ 
(Bender 2000; Beattie 2005a). 
 
In reunified Germany easterners and westerners were now supposed to regard the 
history of the other German state as an integral component of their own history. Only 
then, it was suggested, would inner unity be achieved. This ambitious goal met with 
only moderate success, despite repeated exhortations to come together by listening to 
one another’s histories. Even the Commissions of Inquiry made little effort to convince 
westerners to accept the GDR past as a component of their own history. They held 
numerous public hearings and commemoration ceremonies in eastern cities, but in the 
west only in the parliamentary building in Bonn (Beattie 2005a). Westerners were 
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hardly addressed, with the exception of parts of the western political class on particular 
topics, on which more below. 
 
The west was also neglected in terms of content, and an opportunity thus went begging 
for easterners to learn more about the history of the Federal Republic or for the 
development of a shared history of division. Revealingly, it was often precisely those 
opinion makers who pointed most vociferously to the need for a unified understanding 
of the divided past who simultaneously extracted the Federal Republic from the 
analysis, or who rejected out of hand even the mildest criticism of its history (and 
castigated its critics for obscuring the fundamental distinction between democracy and 
dictatorship). Exempting the western past from examination did not prevent 
conservatives from implicitly or explicitly assessing the East German past against 
western norms or from making occasional politically expedient comparisons. When the 
west was examined, then generally it was in direct connection with the GDR, whether in 
the form of western parties’ policies towards East Germany and the national question, 
the East German regime’s efforts at infiltration and propaganda in the west, or the 
population’s attitudes to the German question and to the GDR. Such issues offered 
western conservatives and eastern dissidents the opportunity to castigate the western 
Left not just for its national indifference, but for having played down the GDR’s 
democratic illegitimacy and human rights abuses (Beattie 2007). Otherwise, the Federal 
Republic featured as a self-evident, natural success story, without conflicts, 
contradictions or ruptures (Beattie 2005a). 
 
In stark contrast, almost every aspect of the history of the East German regime was 
critically examined. The Commissions of Inquiry sought and found not only their main 
audience but also their historical subject matter in the East. The development of a 
common German history of division was thus predicated on a critical reappraisal, 
indeed the delegitimisation, of the East German past. The prevalent narrative of GDR 
history was dominated by the rise and fall of totalitarian, Communist tyranny, and thus 
by repression and resistance. Society and everyday life came into view only as far as 
they provided examples of repression or resistance. The East German state was denied 
any legitimacy, and even its anti-fascist doctrine was depicted as a deceptive, 
hypocritical instrument for justifying Communist dictatorship (Beattie 2005a). 
Easterners thus were not only supposed to internalise uncritically the history of the 
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Federal Republic (apparently through osmosis), but were also to accept this polarised, 
bleak image of their former state. Whoever pointed to any positive aspects to life in the 
GDR ran the risk of being branded an undemocratic apologist for Stalinism or a 
nostalgic irredentist. Even the heritage of the East German opposition and the ‘peaceful 
revolution’ of 1989—which eastern and western anti-Communists often invoked as the 
only positive eastern contribution to the unified country—remained marginal in national 
commemorative activity, as suggested by the absence until the eleventh hour of an 
eastern representative in plans to celebrate the tenth anniversary of unification.7 The 
crude division of the eastern and western pasts into black and white respectively 
reflected the wider balance of power of reunification, and could do little to contribute to 
integration. On the contrary, it contributed to widespread impressions of western 
‘colonisation’ und ‘victor’s justice,’ however one-sided and misleading such notions 
were (Beattie 2005a). 
 
This rough, but by no means inaccurate, sketch of the dominant post-unification 
treatment of Germany’s postwar history applies to public memory until at least the late 
1990s. Clearly, similar treatment would hardly be advisable for Europe. Scholarly 
research, however, assumed more moderate and subtle approaches from the mid-1990s, 
even if it shared (and in part continues to share) some of the same tendencies. During 
the era of division, Communism had been largely written out of German history in the 
west, all the better to condemn the GDR as an illegitimate Soviet import without 
German roots. The presence of German Communists in the western occupation zones 
after the war and in western state parliaments into the 1950s was largely forgotten. 
Since unification, much has been written about the GDR’s fixation on its larger, more 
prosperous western rival, but the formative role played by the eastern ‘ever present 
other’ (Weitz 2001) in West Germany’s political, economic, social and cultural 
development is only slowly being addressed (Kleßmann 2001; Faulenbach 1999). All 
too often, the GDR has been cast merely as an unfortunate failure that was doomed from 
the start, the shadow to the sunny side of the Federal Republic’s success story, while the 
latter can, it seems, still be told with few if any references to the former (Schildt 1999; 
Jarausch 2004a). Historians who seek to do justice to the double past by noting 
conceptual complexities, such as the ‘asymmetrically interconnected parallel history,’ 
                                                 
7 On this point compare McAdams (1997, 307) with Meckel (2001). 
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have remained a minority.8 Even if their scholarly influence is considerable, the impact 
they have on public memory is surely limited. Without expecting the same degree of 
sophistication from public memory as from scholarship, such perspectives would most 
likely have been more conducive to integration than the dominant black-and-white 
images that reflected and legitimised the fundamental asymmetries of unification. 
 
European public memory of the East-West division could profit from considering not 
just the best scholarship on that history, but also the German precedent. The 
asymmetrical relationships and conceptual difficulties of German debates about postwar 
division have numerous European parallels. As in the German case, the East needs to be 
incorporated into a self-satisfied western narrative that takes the western part for the 
whole and treats its history as an unproblematic success story of ever increasing 
prosperity and integration. In both cases the contingency and historicity of the East-
West border is often forgotten. Gregor Thum (2004, 4-5) has pointed convincingly to 
the need to address ‘blank spots in the history of European integration’ in relation to 
eastern Europe. Prominent among these are the frequent equation of western Europe, or 
indeed the EU, with Europe per se, and the erroneous notion of central and eastern 
European countries’ ‘return to Europe’ since 1989, as though they had somehow left the 
continent (Gerner 1999). Crucial to a more inclusive history and conceptualisation of 
European integration, according to Thum (2004), is the recognition, first, that eastern 
Europe and Europeans were central to pre-Cold War notions of Europe and European 
integration and, secondly, that post-1945 western integration was possible and necessary 
precisely because of the continent’s division. Westerners’ failure to recognise that their 
freedom, prosperity and integration came at the expense of eastern Europe’s forced 
integration under Soviet rule (Judt 2005, 242, 303-4) is a continuing source of bitterness 
for many easterners. This was demonstrated by the President of the Republic of Latvia, 
Dr Vaira Vike-Freiberga (2005), in advance of the celebrations to mark the sixtieth 
anniversary of the end of World War Two in Europe. The ubiquitous notion of 
‘liberation’ in 1945 was, and remains, problematic and controversial in eastern Europe 
(including East Germany), a fact that must be considered in narratives of European 
                                                 
8 Asymmetrisch verflochtene Parallelgeschichte (Kleßmann 1993; Bauerkämper et al., 1998; Niethammer 
1999; Faulenbach 1999; Kleßmann 2005). 
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history.9 The self-satisfied and myopic slogan of the European Union (2007a) for the 
celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome—‘Together since 1957’—
suggests that more critical reflection is required in this regard.10
 
Both contexts display insufficient readiness to differentiate within the relevant ‘East.’ 
Popular generalisations about easterners (and westerners) were counterproductive in 
Germany, and the East-West dichotomy served to obscure vital distinctions among 
representatives, supporters, critics, victims and opponents of the East German regime. 
Evaluations of the GDR were determined more by ideological and political beliefs than 
by geography, and there were both ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ with the end of the Cold War 
and unification.11 This also applies to eastern Europe. It is important, as Judt (2000, 
307; 2005, 202) stresses, to consider divergent experiences, attitudes and memories 
within eastern European countries, as well as those between them (Troebst 2006). The 
historical activities of the Council of Europe suggest such awareness and a degree of 
openness to multiple perspectives, although pluralism is frequently conceived in ethno-
national rather than ideological terms (Stradling 2003). 
 
The ideological blinkeredness of much public memory and some scholarship in 
Germany also has European equivalents. In scholarly and public depictions of eastern 
European history or histories, one often finds the familiar reduction of the past to that of 
the rule and crimes of the totalitarian party-state. Complex histories are reduced to a 
‘Black Book’ (Courtois et al., 1999). Simple dichotomies between democracy and 
dictatorship abound. Where, for example, western European school history textbooks 
move beyond the absolute dichotomies of the Cold War conflict between the 
superpowers, they perhaps mention perestroika, while many texts in post-Communist 
states simply externalise and demonise Communism, which appears exclusively as a 
Soviet imposition without any indigenous roots. The ‘end of History’ seems to have 
                                                 
9 German proponents of the totalitarian paradigm also stress that only the western part of the country was 
liberated in 1945 (Möller 1995; Knabe 2005). The notion of liberation has more complex implications in 
Germany than in countries occupied by the Nazis, being potentially either self-exculpatory or, when 
contrasted with the notion of defeat, more critical (Frei 2005). 
10 The German language version of the website of the European Union (2007b) provides an excellent 
example of the equation of the EU with Europe, stating—where other languages merely call for ‘Europe’ 
to be celebrated—that ‘Europa is having its birthday’ (Europa hat Geburtstag). 
11 The superimposition of the East-West issue was not least the result of PDS efforts to redefine itself as a, 
indeed the only, eastern party, and to depict critical views of the East German past as emanating from the 
West (Oswald 2004; Beattie 2005a). 
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made substantial discussion of socialism, Marxism, Leninism, Communism or 
capitalism virtually redundant for European history textbooks, and society and the social 
question are largely ignored (Pingel 2000).12 How people lived under Communist 
regimes is not explored, and neither is how they received and responded to official 
ideological dictates, for example in the realm of public memory (Karge N.d). 
Differentiated and nuanced depictions are rare, and the historicisation of Communism 
appears to be more advanced in Germany than further east (Kolář 2006; Pingel 2000, 
45). 
 
It remains difficult to assess whether rather diffuse European public memory regarding 
the history of the Cold War resembles or avoids the extremes of the rigorous anti-
Communism found in Germany and numerous eastern European countries. A resolution 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2006) on the ‘Need for 
international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian Communist regimes,’ employs a 
familiar uncompromising vocabulary. The resolution provides an unspecific catalogue 
of Communist crimes, and yet it also acknowledges that Communist Parties have made 
(similarly unspecified) contributions to democracy. The resolution could hardly be said 
to contribute to a complex understanding of the past, even if it has symbolic value in 
indicating that Communist crimes have not been forgotten. 
 
There is perhaps even less awareness at European level than there was in Germany that 
Cold War ideological conflicts also ran through western societies and that at the end of 
the conflict there were, therefore, also ‘losers’ in the west. Although The Black Book of 
Communism (Courtois et al. 1999) is rightly interpreted not least as a criticism of the 
western European Left, Communism in the west is barely mentioned in discussions 
about developing a common European memory (Rousso 2004, 1; Morgan N.d.). As in 
Germany, the issue is often treated as one that only concerns the East. A European 
discussion of Communism in the west would most likely be more productive and less 
ideologically confrontational than the German debates, which in large part remained at 
the level of a highly moralised (neo-)conservative reckoning with the western Left. 
After all, the histories of Communist Parties in France and Italy are significantly 
                                                 
12 Here the intensity of German attention to the East German past in school and university curricula and 
texts is rather atypical, although the GDR boom of the early and mid 1990s died down by the end of the 
decade (Pasternack 2001; Hüttmann 2004; Arnswald 2004). 
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different from the smaller and more marginal Communist Party of Germany (KPD) of 
the first postwar decade, or from the German Communist Party (DKP) of the 1970s, and 
are hardly reducible to their manipulation by Moscow (or East Berlin). Genuinely 
transnational perspectives on interactions and permeations across the Iron Curtain (or 
within the Soviet bloc) appear to be similarly necessary and difficult to achieve as their 
German equivalents, even if the roll of eastern Europe or Russia as the ‘Other’ in the 
construction of (western) Europe is already better understood than its German-German 
counterpart (Karge N.d). A shared memory of Europe’s divided Cold War past that does 
justice not only to manifold historical complexities and interactions but also to divergent 
contemporary perspectives is hardly in sight. If indeed the pursuit of that goal is deemed 
necessary, it could benefit both from considerable achievements in the fields of German 
and European historical scholarship, as well as from the significant failures of German 
public memory after unification. 
 
A European ‘Historians’ Dispute’? 
The notion of the usefulness for ‘Europe’ of German experiences in dealing with 
complicated pasts refers generally to the handling of the ‘double’ totalitarian past of 
Nazism and Communism, rather than that of the double postwar past of democracy and 
dictatorship. The foregoing discussion of the modalities of the latter is nevertheless 
necessary not only because of the obvious, if often overlooked, parallels between the 
German and European division into East and West, but also because the treatment of 
Nazism and Communism cannot be understood without it. The debate about the two 
totalitarianisms required the demonisation of the GDR, as discussed above, while the 
black-and-white approach to the two postwar states played a significant role in attitudes 
to the public memory of National Socialism in postwar and post-unification Germany. 
There is much to be said for a generally positive assessment of the German handling of 
the double past of Nazism and Communism, especially in comparison with contrasting 
examples from some eastern European countries (Judt 2005, 824-29). Yet a degree of 
caution is necessary. Jan-Werner Müller (2007) rightly questions the suitability of the 
German model of ‘coming to terms with the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) for 
European export. Indeed, whether it can be characterised as a model is also open to 
question. 
 
 
PORTAL vol. 4 no. 2, July 2007  13 
Beattie                   Learning from the Germans? 
The postulated exemplary character of German public debates about the double past for 
Europe rests, in part, on their misrepresentation or misunderstanding. It is often 
assumed that the 1990s saw the relatively straightforward and final establishment of a 
consensus in Germany that regards the Holocaust as at once historically unique and of 
singular paramount importance for German public memory. The construction of the 
Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in the heart of Berlin appears to support this 
assumption (Müller 2001, 268-69; Niven 2002). A common implication is that a similar 
development must now take place at European level. A variant on this view is the 
suggestion by Judt that eastern European countries require their own ‘Historians’ 
Dispute,’ along the lines of that experienced by West Germany in the mid 1980s (2000, 
315). This argument implies incorrectly that the famous debate finally settled the thorny 
questions of the historical comparability, and of the relative significance for 
contemporary public memory, of Nazism and Communism. It overlooks the renewal of 
the dispute after 1989, when the earlier apparent victory of the Left was vigorously re-
contested by the Right. Rather revealingly, too, Judt’s suggestion ignores the 
perspectives of those who lived under Communism, because the Historians’ Dispute 
was a West German affair. Accounts that suggest that the same outcome—the 
Holocaust’s historical singularity and its primacy in public memory—was achieved in 
the course of the 1990s are similarly problematic. They underestimate the diversity of 
opinion, the extent of conflict, and the fragility of the consensus that ostensibly 
emerged. 
 
In fact, German debates and their outcomes were highly ambivalent. On the one hand, 
both in and beyond the Commissions of Inquiry, eastern dissidents and victims of 
Communism and western conservatives promoted the totalitarian paradigm (once again) 
as a quasi-official doctrine. They also sought to minimise differences between the mass 
crimes and the manifold forms of military and political violence in the twentieth 
century, and to commemorate all of their victims together. Such tendencies represented 
a revision of the apparent outcome of the West German Historians’ Dispute, and were 
only in part successful (Beattie 2006). On the other hand, the recognition of the 
singularity of the Holocaust of European Jews, and of the need to compensate and 
commemorate its victims, was raised to unparalleled normative status in the course of 
the delegitimisation of official East German anti-fascism (and not only in that context). 
These apparently contradictory positions—challenging the Holocaust’s singularity and 
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primacy, and castigating the GDR for not acknowledging them—were sometimes 
advocated by the same people. In the hearing protocols and the reports of the 
Commissions of Inquiry one finds support both for the equation of ‘red’ and ‘brown’ 
regimes and the equal standing of their victims, and for the insistence on the 
inadmissibility of such equations (Beattie 2005a). Thus the course and result of the 
renewed historians’ dispute was not as unambiguous as is often assumed. 
 
Commentators who suggest that Europe could learn from the Germans in these matters 
often have in mind the apparently satisfactory result of German debates. They thus 
ignore the fact that such debates are (and must be) contested again and again. Indeed, 
they seem to construe, or perhaps want to draw, a ‘final line’ (Schlussstrich) under the 
old debates about whether a final line should be drawn under the past. However, the 
place of Nazi crimes in German public memory is subject to continual renegotiation. Its 
alleged primacy was challenged by adherents of totalitarianism in the 1980s, 1990s and 
early 2000s, and has been repeatedly disputed by those who want more recognition of 
German victims of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath (Beattie 2006). 
The Vergegenwärtigung (recollection and making-present) of various pasts must always 
occur anew. Moreover, the ensuing debates are to be welcomed, rather than abhorred, if 
public memory is not to become irrelevant or ossify through ritualisation. 
 
The German experiences outlined here can and should be regarded as a model for 
‘Europe’ only to a limited extent. Yet the form of German debates—carried out as an 
open dispute about the interpretation and meaning of multiple pasts, at least in part in 
tandem and in communication with scholarly research—is worthy of imitation. Most 
useful in terms of content is the guiding principle that gradually established itself in 
German commemorative politics in the course of the 1990s, and that enjoys support 
across the political mainstream: ‘Nazi crimes must not be relativised by the 
confrontation with the crimes of Stalinism. Stalinist crimes must not be trivialised 
through reference to the Nazi crimes’ (Deutscher Bundestag 1999, I: 614).13 Disputes 
continue about the relative weighting of, and the degree of similarity between, the two 
totalitarian regimes and their macro crimes, but largely on the basis of this consensus 
                                                 
13 Die NS-Verbrechen dürfen durch die Auseinandersetzung mit den Verbrechen des Stalinismus nicht 
relativiert werden. Die stalinistischen Verbrechen dürfen durch den Hinweis auf die NS-Verbrechen nicht 
bagatellisiert werden. 
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(Beattie 2006). Intellectual or political complacency should not lead us either to forget 
that this minimal consensus was not predetermined, or to ignore that it may be 
challenged in the future. 
 
The post-unification treatment of the approaches to the Nazi past of the two postwar 
German states is instructive here. A broad coalition strongly criticized East German 
anti-fascism not just for its top-down character, but also for its insufficient attention to 
the Holocaust. Both criticisms were justified. And yet the common conclusion that 
inadequate and phoney East German public memory had now to be brought into line 
with the laudable and authentic approach of the west was highly problematic. Some 
western conservative politicians and historians used the critique of the East to glorify 
western compensation policies, and to iron out the conflict-ridden history of the western 
confrontation with German guilt and responsibility. In the process, the acceptance of the 
Holocaust as the central event of German history was projected back into the 1950s. 
Conveniently forgotten in these critiques was that the key aspects of federal republican 
public memory, which now enjoyed normative status, had developed as recently as the 
1980s or indeed the 1990s. In fact, a lack of attention to the Holocaust, and a preference 
for concentrating on one’s own suffering or anti-Nazi resistance, had characterised not 
just the GDR, but also the West at least until the 1960s (Beattie 2005a). 
 
Indeed, these characteristics were found in almost every European society for much of 
the postwar era, and not simply in eastern Europe into the 1990s (Lagrou 2000; Judt 
2005, 804-20; Lebow et al., 2006). Recent attempts to transform the Holocaust into the 
EU’s foundational myth thus rewrite and distort the historical record in similar (if 
perhaps less partisan) fashion to the efforts of German conservatives after unification. In 
contrast with the desire to prevent a further war among European countries, the 
genocide was of no significance for early western integration. That this is often 
overlooked from a presentist perspective contributes to a widespread sense of western 
superiority (Joerges 2005, 247-50; Berger N.d.). It renders ‘backward’ eastern 
Europeans who (still) utilise the totalitarian paradigm or challenge the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness. This was evident in the interpretation of the 2004 conflict between Salomon 
Korn of the Central Council of Jews in Germany and the Latvian EU Commissioner 
Sandra Kalniete—over her insistence on the equal criminality of Communism and 
Nazism—as a conflict between west and east respectively (Jarausch 2004b, 4-5). In fact, 
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the difference of opinion that arose exists not (only) between east and west but within 
each ‘camp.’ Like its German counterpart, the inaccurate east-west dichotomy 
legitimises pressure on the eastern side to conform to a seemingly unquestionable but, in 
fact, contested western norm (Joerges 2005, 247). In the process, it is often forgotten 
that the historical and symbolic foundations of the European community were, are and 
will continue to be, subject to change. 
 
However problematic its backward projection may be, Holocaust memory has assumed 
considerable significance for the identity of many Europeans and for attempts to 
cultivate a European identity. For example, in 2002 the Council of Europe (2007b) 
decided to introduce a continent-wide Day of Remembrance, albeit with the flexibility 
for individual countries to select the most appropriate date. It is noteworthy that most of 
western and northern Europe, including Germany, commemorates the liberation of 
Auschwitz, other Nazi concentration camps, or the relevant country itself. Only (but not 
universally) in central-eastern and eastern Europe do the chosen dates bear direct 
relation to repression or crimes, and thus a connection to the perpetrators and not (just) 
the victims is created. Indeed, ‘cosmopolitan memory’ of the Holocaust generally 
focuses on the victims, and de-contextualisation, de-territorialisation and 
universalisation are its preconditions and consequences (Levy & Sznaider 2002, 100-3). 
Instead of engaging (self-)critically with the particularities of the history of bystanders, 
accomplices and perpetrators in many European countries, the much sought-after 
common memory glides over past divisions and does not go beyond the affect of 
Betroffenheit (consternation). It thus militates against understanding the Holocaust’s 
specific historical causes, course and consequences, despite the appeal of the Stockholm 
International Forum on the Holocaust (2001) to address precisely these dimensions. The 
example of the Council of Europe’s Day of Remembrance should not taken to be 
representative of the various national public memories, but it nevertheless casts into 
doubt the frequently assumed German or western European entitlement and suitability 
to assume the role of instructor for eastern Europe or ‘Europe’ collectively on matters of 
Holocaust memory. 
 
Conclusion 
In contrast with the frequently assumed exemplary status of recent German experiences, 
I have argued for a more critical and nuanced understanding of unified Germany’s 
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handling of its complicated history. One should not be content with focusing merely on 
the (occasionally misrepresented) result of debates, but must also consider their inherent 
ambivalences and contingency. A fuller understanding, including of possible European 
parallels, demands consideration not only of the repeatedly renewed dispute over the 
appropriate place of Communism and Nazism in public memory, but also of the 
handling of the German division in the Cold War. Indeed, both the complex course of 
discussion about the precedence either of totalitarianism or of Holocaust singularity, and 
the highly asymmetrical handling of the postwar past, cast doubt on suggestions of a 
German recipe for successful integrative public memory. If any lessons can be drawn 
for Europe, they are not necessarily positive. 
 
The German experience after 1990 demonstrates above all the necessity, but also the 
difficulty, of multiple perspectives, self-criticism and self-reflection. Only conscious 
efforts to minimise the political and symbolic disparities of the integration process offer 
the prospect of avoiding the neglect of diverse eastern (and western) experiences, 
memories and priorities and their assimilation with a falsely glorified western norm. 
Oversimplified western success stories and eastern horror stories alike are to be 
avoided. The European doctrine of ‘unity in diversity’ guarantees a degree of plurality 
that was lacking in the nation-state context of Germany. Nevertheless, it is essential to 
address differences and conflicts not only between nations, but also within them. 
Complexity is necessary if divergent experiences and processes in different contexts—
let alone their mutual interactions and interdependencies—are to be addressed. 
Sensitivity to historicity and contingency can also help reduce entrenched assumptions 
of western superiority and eastern backwardness. The projection of contemporary 
values and understandings of the past back into one’s own history does little for one’s 
credibility or readiness for a genuine dialogue, and reduces the past to myth. It also fails 
to recognise that processing, interpreting and appropriating the past never ceases, but is 
constantly renewed. 
 
In Germany in the course of the 1990s it gradually became evident that east-west 
differences would not quickly disappear and that integration—above all of differing 
understandings of history—would not be ‘achieved’ in the immediate future (Hilsberg 
1996). It was also recognised, more slowly and less universally, that this did not 
threaten the nation’s ‘inner unity’ or democracy (Beattie 2007). Such lessons hardly 
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need to be learnt on the European stage. Expansion and integration proceed in full 
consciousness of divergent, conflicting memories. Yet the asymmetries of memories 
and of intellectual capital remain similar. Openness to differences of opinion and 
possibilities for communication can always be expanded. In light of the heated debates 
in Germany in the early 1990s, the creation of a minimal consensus against the 
trivialisation of Communist crimes and the relativisation of Nazi crimes is remarkable. 
It was only possible in dialogue. It did not resolve every question or settle every 
argument. Yet it constitutes an advance precisely for that reason. Opposing perspectives 
may be painful or obnoxious but, in trying to learn from the ‘bitter experiences’ of 
history and overcome ‘past divisions,’ they are far better included and addressed than 
ignored or excluded. The phrases of the preamble to the EU constitution are vague and 
unspecific. But in so far as they recall the difficult past at all and stand in contrast to the 
myth of ‘reunited’ Europe, they are to be welcomed, particularly if they provoke debate. 
 
 
Reference List 
Arnswald, U. 2004, Zum Stellenwert des Themas DDR-Geschichte in den Lehrplänen der deutschen 
Bundesländer, Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur, Berlin [Online]. Available: 
http://www.stiftung-aufarbeitung.de/dokumentation/onlinearchiv.php [accessed 28 Mar. 2007]. 
Bauerkämper, A., Sabrow, M., & Stöver, B. (eds.) 1998, Doppelte Zeitgeschichte: Deutsch-deutsche 
Beziehungen 1945-1990, Dietz, Bonn. 
Beattie, A. H. 2005a, ‘Contested Legitimacy after the Cold War: The Bundestag Commissions of Inquiry 
into the East German Past,’ PhD dissertation, The University of Sydney. 
Beattie, A. H. 2005b, ‘The Past in the Politics of Divided and Unified Germany,’ in Partisan Histories: 
The Past in Contemporary Global Politics, eds. M. P. Friedman and P. Kenney, Palgrave 
MacMillan, New York, 17-38. 
Beattie, A. H. 2006. ‘The Victims of Totalitarianism and the Centrality of Nazi Genocide: Continuity and 
Change in German Commemorative Politics,’ in Germans as Victims: Contemporary Germany 
and the Third Reich, ed. B. Niven, Palgrave, London, 147-63. 
Beattie, A. H. 2007, ‘Cold War Culture in Post-Cold War Germany: Rehabilitation and Resurrection?,’ 
paper presented at European Cold War Cultures? Societies, Media and Cold War Experiences in 
East and West (1947-1990), Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, Germany, 26-28 
April. 
Bender, P. 2000, ‘“Willkommen in Deutschland”,’ in Zehn Jahre deutsche Einheit: Eine Bilanz, eds. W. 
Thierse, I. Spittmann-Rühle and J. L. Kuppe, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 13-21. 
Berger, S. N.d. (in preparation), ‘Remembering the Second World War, 1945-2005: Western Europe,’ in 
The Politics of Commemoration: The Search for the Past in the Shaping of a European Culture, 
eds. M. Pakier and B. Stråth. 
Council of Europe 2007a, History Teaching [Online]. Available: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-
operation/education/History%5FTeaching/ [accessed 28 Mar. 2007]. 
Council of Europe 2007b, Teaching Remembrance [Online]. Available: 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/cultural_co-operation/education/remembrance/4.Reference%20documents. 
asp#TopOfPage [accessed 28 Mar. 2007]. 
Courtois, S., Werth, N., Panné, J.-L., Paczkowski, A., Bartosek, K., & Margolin, J.-L. 1999, The Black 
Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, trans. J. Murphy and M. Kramer, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
PORTAL vol. 4 no. 2, July 2007  19 
Beattie                   Learning from the Germans? 
Domnitz, C. 2007, ‘Geschichtsstunde: Europa debattiert über gemeinsames Schulbuch,’ Der 
Tagesspiegel, 6 March. 
Deutscher Bundestag (ed.) 1995, Materialien der Enquete-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und 
Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland’ (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.  
Deutscher Bundestag (ed.) 1999, Materialien der Enquete-Kommission ‘Überwindung der Folgen der 
SED-Diktatur im Prozess der deutschen Einheit’ (13. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main. 
European Union 2004, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe [Online]. Available: 
http://europa.eu.int/constitution/en/ptoc1_en.htm#a1 [accessed 29 Mar. 2007]. 
European Union 2007a, Celebrating Europe! 50th Anniversary of the Treaty of Rome [Online]. Available: 
http://europa.eu/50/index_en.htm [accessed 29 Mar. 2007]. 
European Union 2007b, Europa hat Geburtstag! 50. Jahrestag des Vertrags von Rom [Online]. 
Available: http://europa.eu/50/index_de.htm [accessed 30 Mar. 2007]. 
Faulenbach, B. 1999, ‘Acht Jahre deutsch-deutsche Vergangenheitsdebatte: Aspekte einer kritischen 
Bilanz,’ in Deutsche Vergangenheiten – eine gemeinsame Herausforderung: Der schwierige 
Umgang mit der doppelten Nachkriegsgeschichte, eds. C. Kleßmann, H. Misselwitz and G. 
Wichert, Christoph Links, Berlin, 15-34. 
Faulenbach, B. 2006, ‘Öffentliches Erinnern im vereinten Deutschland und in Osteuropa seit den 1990er 
Jahren,’ in Instrumentalisierung, Verdrängung, Aufarbeitung: Die sowjetischen Speziallager in der 
gesellschaftlichen Wahrnehmung 1945 bis heute, eds. P. Haustein, A. Kaminsky, V. Knigge and B. 
Ritscher, Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen, 233-49. 
Frei, N. 2005, 1945 und wir: Das dritte Reich im Bewußtsein der Deutschen, C. H. Beck, Munich. 
Gellner, N. & Glatzmeier, A. 2005, ‘Die Suche nach der europäischen Zivilgesellschaft,’ Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, vol. 55, no. 36, 8-15. 
Gerner, K. 1999, ‘A Moveable Place with a Moveable Past: Perspectives on Central Europe,’ Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 1, 3-19. 
Hilsberg, S. 1996, ‘Die innere Einheit Deutschlands: Eine brauchbare Vision?, Deutschland Archiv, vol. 
29, no. 4, 607-12. 
Hochberg, A. 1998, ‘Lessons from German Unification for European Integration? A Conceptual 
Approach,’ in East Germany’s Economic Development Since Unification, eds. J. Hoscher and A. 
Hochberg, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Hüttmann, J. 2004, Die ‘Gelehrte DDR’ und ihre Akteure: Inhalte, Motivationen, Strategien, Die DDR 
als Gegenstand von Lehre und Forschung an deutschen Universitäten, Institut für 
Hochschulforschung, Wittenberg [Online]. Available: http://www.stiftung-
aufarbeitung.de/downloads/pdf/hof_akteure.pdf [accessed 28 Mar. 2007]. 
Jarausch, K. H. 1994, The Rush to German Unity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Jarausch, K. H. 1995, ‘Normalisierung oder Re-Nationalisierung? Zur Umdeutung der deutschen 
Vergangenheit,’ Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 21, no. 4, 571-84. 
Jarausch, K. H. 2004a, ‘“Die Teile als Ganzes erkennen”: Zur Integration der beiden deutschen 
Nachkriegsgeschichten,’ Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, vol. 1, no. 
1, 10-30. 
Jarausch, K. H. 2004b, ‘Zeitgeschichte zwischen Nation und Europa: Eine transnationale 
Herausforderung,’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 54, no. 39, 3-10. 
Jarausch, K. H. & Lindenberger, T. (eds.) 2007, Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary 
Histories, Berghahn, New York. 
Joerges, C. 2005, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: Confronting Memories: European “Bitter 
Experiences” and the Constitutionalization Process, Constructing Europe in the Shadow of its 
Pasts,’ German Law Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, 245-54. 
Judt, T. 2000, ‘The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,’ in The Politics of 
Retribution in Europe: World War II and its Aftermath, eds. I. Deak, J. T. Gross and T. Judt, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 293-323. 
Judt, T. 2005, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, Penguin, London. 
Karge, H. N.d. (forthcoming), ‘Practices and Politics of World War Two Remembrance: (Trans-) 
National Perspectives from East and Southeast Europe,’ in The Politics of Commemoration: The 
Search for the Past in the Shaping of a European Culture, eds. M. Pakier and B. Stråth. 
Kleßmann, C. 1993, ‘Verflechtung und Abgrenzung: Aspekte der geteilten und zusammengehörigen 
deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte,’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 43, no. 29-30, 30-41. 
Kleßmann, C. (ed.) 2001, The Divided Past: Rewriting Post-War German History, Berg, Oxford. 
 
PORTAL vol. 4 no. 2, July 2007  20 
Beattie                   Learning from the Germans? 
Kleßmann, C. 2005, ‘Konturen einer integrierten Nachkriegsgeschichte,’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 
vol. 55, no. 18-19, 3-11. 
Knabe, H. 2005, Tag der Befreiung? Das Kriegsende in Ostdeutschland, Propyläen, Berlin. 
Kocka, J. 1995, Vereinigungskrise: Zur Geschichte der Gegenwart, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen. 
Kolář, P. 2006, ‘Langsamer Abschied vom Totalitarismus-Paradigma? Neue tschechische Forschungen 
zur Geschichte der KPTsch-Diktatur,’ Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropaforschung, vol. 55, no. 2, 
253-75. 
Lagrou, P. 2000, Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western 
Europe, 1945-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Langenbacher, E. 2003, ‘Changing Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany?, German Politics and 
Society, vol. 21, no. 2, 46-68. 
Lebow, R. N., Kansteiner, W., & Fogu, C. (eds.) 2006, The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, Duke 
University Press, Durham. 
Levy, D., & Sznaider, N. 2002, ‘The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory,’ European 
Journal of Social Theory, vol. 5, no. 1, 87-106. 
McAdams, A. J. 1997, ‘Germany after Unification: Normal at Last?,’ World Politics, vol. 49, no. 2, 282-
308. 
Meckel, M. 2001, ‘Kritischer Rückblick auf die Gedenkfeiern der 10. Jahrestage von friedlicher 
Revolution und deutscher Vereinigung,’ in Selbstbewußt in die deutsche Einheit: Rückblicke und 
Reflexionen, Berlin Verlag, Berlin, 219-25. 
Möller, H. 1995, ‘Die Relativität historischer Epochen: Das Jahr 1945 in der Perspektive des Jahres 
1989,’ Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, vol. 45, no. 18-19, 3-10. 
Monteath, P. 1999, ‘Contemporary Europe: Histories and Identities, Introduction,’ Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 1, 1-2. 
Morgan, K. N.d. (in preparation), ‘Neither Help nor Pardon? Communist Pasts in Western Europe,’ in 
The Politics of Commemoration: The Search for the Past in the Shaping of a European Culture, 
eds. M. Pakier and B. Stråth. 
Müller, J.-W. 2001, ‘East Germany: Incorporation, Tainted Truth, and the Double Division,’ in The 
Politics of Memory and Democratization: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, eds. B. 
De Brito, C. Gonzalez Enriquez and P. Aguilar, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 248-74. 
Müller, J.-W. 2007 (forthcoming), ‘Thomas Manns Albtraum? Potential und Paradoxien europäischer 
Erinnerungspolitik,’ in ‘Schmerzliche Erfahrungen’ der Vergangenheit und der Prozess der 
Konstitutionalisierung Europas, eds. C. Joerges, M. Mahlmann and U. K. Preuß, Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. 
Niethammer, L. 1999, ‘Methodische Überlegungen zur deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte: 
Doppelgeschichte, Nationalgeschichte oder asymmetrisch verflochtene Parallelgeschichte,’ in 
Deutsche Vergangenheiten – eine gemeinsame Herausforderung: Der schwierige Umgang mit der 
doppelten Nachkriegsgeschichte, eds. C. Kleßmann, H. Misselwitz and G. Wichert, Christoph 
Links, Berlin, 307-27. 
Niven, B. 2002, Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich, Routledge, 
London. 
Oswald, F. 2004, ‘Negotiating Identities: The Party of Democratic Socialism between East German 
Regionalism, German National Identity and European Integration,’ Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, vol. 50, no. 1, 75-85. 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2006, Resolution 1481: ‘Need for International 
Condemnation of Crimes of Totalitarian Communist Regimes.’ [Online]. Available: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/ERES1481.htm [accessed 
13 Mar. 2007]. 
Pasternack, P. 2001, Gelehrte DDR: Die DDR als Gegenstand der Lehre an deutschen Universitäten 
1990-2000, Institut für Hochschulforschung, Wittenberg [Online]. Available: http://www.stiftung-
aufarbeitung.de/dokumentation/onlinearchiv.php [accessed 28 Mar. 2007]. 
Pavković, A. 2000, ‘Constructing a European Identity: Problems of Supranationalism,’ in Why Europe? 
Problems of Culture and Identity, eds. J. Andrew, E. Kolinsky and M. Waller, Macmillan, London, 
115-30. 
Pingel, F. 2000, The European Home: Representations of 20th Century Europe in History Textbooks, 
Council of Europe, Strasbourg. 
Pratt, M. 2005, ‘Imagining Union: European Cultural Identity in the Pre-Federal Future Perfect,’ Portal 
Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 [Online]. Available: 
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/portal/article/view/110/69 [accessed 13 Mar. 2007]. 
 
PORTAL vol. 4 no. 2, July 2007  21 
Beattie                   Learning from the Germans? 
Rousso, H. 2004, ‘Das Dilemma eines europäischen Gedächtnisses,’ Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies 
in Contemporary History, vol. 1, no. 3 [Online]. Available: http://www.zeithistorische-
forschungen.de/site/40208268/default.aspx [accessed 13 Mar. 2007]. 
Schildt, A. 1999, Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik, S. Fischer, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
Sinn, H. W. 2000, ‘EU Enlargement, Migration, and Lessons from German Unification,’ German 
Economic Review, vol. 1, no. 3, 299-314. 
Speth, R. 1999, ‘Europäische Geschichtsbilder heute,’ in Umkämpfte Vergangenheit: Geschichtsbilder, 
Erinnerung und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich, eds. P. Bock and E. Wolfrum, 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 159-75. 
Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, 2001, Declaration of the Stockholm International 
Forum on the Holocaust [Online]. Available: 
http://www.holocaustforum.gov.se/pdfandforms/deklarat..pdf [accessed 13 Mar. 2007]. 
Stradling, R. 2003, Multiperspectivity in History Teaching: A Guide for Teachers, Council of Europe, 
Strasbourg. 
Thum, G. 2004, ‘“Europa” in Ostblock: Weiße Flecken in der Geschichte der europäischen Integration,’ 
Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, vol. 1, no. 3 [Online]. Available: 
http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/site/40208270/default.aspx [accessed 30 Mar. 2007]. 
Troebst, S. 2006, ‘Am Anfang des GULag-Gedächtnisses: Das Jahr 1956 und Europas aktuelle 
Erinnerungskonflikte,’ Deutschland Archiv, vol. 39, no. 1, 19-26. 
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik über die 
Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands, 1990 [Online]. Available: http://www.jura.uni-
sb.de/Vertraege/Einheit/ein1_e.htm [accessed 13 Mar. 2007]. 
Vike-Freiberga, V. 2005, Declaration by H.E. Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga, President of the Republic of 
Latvia regarding 9 May 2005, Riga, 12 January [Online]. Available: 
http://www.am.gov.lv/en/news/speeches/2005/January/12-1/ [accessed 13 Mar. 2007]. 
Weitz, E. D. 2001, ‘The Ever-Present Other: Communism in the Making of West Germany,’ in The 
Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. H. Schissler, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 219-32. 
Wüstenberg, R. K. 2004, Die politische Dimension der Versöhnung: Eine theologische Studie zum 
Umgang mit Schuld nach den Systemumbrüchen in Südafrika und Deutschland, Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, Gütersloh. 
Zens, M. 2000, ‘Truism and Taboo: The Rhetoric of the Berlin Republic,’ in Political Thought and 
German Reunification: The New German Ideology, eds. H. Williams, C. Wight and N. Kapferer, 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 64-95. 
 
PORTAL vol. 4 no. 2, July 2007  22 
